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While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than those observed. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalties rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.  
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Neoclassical theory predicts that there is an interaction between audit and penalty rates when individuals decide how much income to declare for tax. When the audit rate increases, the increase in income declaration depends on the penalty. When the penalty increases, the increase in income declaration depends on the audit rate (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Myles 1995). The influence of interaction between audit and penalty rates (e.g. as noted in Kirchler et al 2010 literature survey) might be deduced from results presented in Alm et al (1995). But how important are these interaction effects when individuals decide how much income to declare for taxation?
While neoclassical theory assumes that individuals behave as if they have solved an expected utility maximisation problem, in practice individuals, with limited cognitive ability, are more likely to acquire expertise in a repeated decision-making process. Learning is likely to be very important when analysing taxpayers’ response to different audit and penalty rates, and when predicting levels of tax compliance. In this paper the objective is to assess the importance of learning and the importance of a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates in a learning process. If learning how to comply with taxation is acquired in a repeated decision-making process, will ‘learning’ be relevant when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of compliance? 
This paper begins by focusing on subjects’ responses in two experiments. These experiments are designed to shed insight into the pattern of interaction between audit and penalty rates. A partial factorial design is used in these experiments. The impact of increased audit rates on declared income is assessed when the penalty is fixed. The impact of increased penalty rates on declared income is also assessed when the audit rate is fixed. 
Later in the paper the focus is on the impact of an adaptive learning model (premised on a selection mechanism and based on optimisation principles). The questions are (i) whether the pattern of tax compliance depends on interaction between audit and penalty rates, and (ii) whether the tax compliance observed in experiments is consistent with the pattern of tax compliance predicted when taxpayers employ an adaptive learning process.
This methodology has been employed in other studies. Axelrod (1980, 1990) employs this approach to examine effective strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Simulation results confirmed the robustness of the strategy (tit-for-tat) that proved so successful in computer tournaments. Andreoni and Miller (1991) employed this approach to explain observed patterns of response in the ‘public goods’ game. In the ‘public goods’ game, theoretical results and simulations based on the learning process are generally in agreement (although free riding often proves to be lower than anticipated in experiments). Gale et al (1995) employ this approach to analyse the ultimatum game. In the case of the ultimatum game, the learning process results in an outcome that exceeds theoretical predictions, but an outcome that is consistent with observations in experiments​[1]​. This paper sets out to apply the same methodology to analyse tax compliance. Can observations reported in individual decision-making experiments be explained with reference to simulations generated when there is an adaptive learning process? Will the pattern of tax compliance predicted by an adaptive learning process converge to the level of tax compliance that is predicted by neoclassical theory?
While a variety of dynamic simulation models have been adopted to examine different aspects of tax compliance (e.g. Mittone and Patelli, 2000; Blomquist, 2006; Pommerenhe et al, 1994), this paper sets out to focus on ‘learning’. The impact of ‘learning’ has yet to be examined explicitly in the tax compliance literature.  
The adaptive learning model used in this study is based on optimization principles; there is a greater likelihood of adoption of the most successful decisions. Will an adaptive learning process (that guides individuals towards decisions with the highest utility) lead individuals to fully rational decisions? Is learning relevant when explaining differences between levels of compliance predicted by the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model and levels of compliance that are observed? To date, the literature has attempted to explain these differences by challenging the assumptions of the Allingham-Sandmo model, e.g. that taxpayers have full knowledge of audit rates and penalty rates; that taxpayers are as self-interested as homo economicus; that taxpayers ignore social norms (e.g. Alm et al, 1992; Torgler, 2002; Cullis and Jones, 2009). In this paper, there is another, perhaps more natural, explanation. The difference between predicted and reported levels of compliance might also depend on the process by which individuals learn to comply. Differences between predicted and reported levels are likely to depend (in part) on the observation that individuals are continually engaged in a process of learning how to comply. 
The next section of the paper describes the experiments designed to question the relevance of the interaction between audit and penalty rates. Section three presents a description of the adaptive learning algorithm and the simulation results that are used to predict behaviour. When focussing on the learning process, the intention is to rely on plausible utility functions. Later in the paper experimental results are compared with simulations drawn from an adaptive learning process. Are the experimental responses consistent with the proposition that citizens are learning how to comply with taxation?  The final section of the paper considers the policy implications.

2. The experimental study

2.1. Theoretical background 





For risk-averse individuals, increasing the audit rate or the penalty rate leads to higher compliance (see for example Cullis and Jones, 2009). While a change in optimal declared income is positively related to increases in the audit rate or penalty rate, the magnitude of the change is likely to be dependent on both variables (see Myles, 1995)​[2]​. When the audit rate changes, the change in the optimal declared income depends on the level of the penalty rate (and vice-versa). Interaction effects may prove to be significant empirically. In the absence of interaction, the effect of the penalty rate may be averaged over all levels of the audit rate (and vice-versa) and statistical analysis would be meaningful. However, statistical techniques might not reveal the extent of deterrence if interaction is present and unaccounted for, because the basis for correct interpretation of empirical results depends on the inclusion of interaction terms (Cox and Reid, 2000). 

2.2 Description of the experiment

2.2.1. Aim and design of experiments
In this paper the intention is to assess the relevance of interaction effects in two tax experiments. A mixed factorial design is used to examine the interaction effect, (see Christensen, 1997; Friedman and Sunder, 1994 for a more detailed description)​[3]​.  In the first experiment three sessions were conducted with the penalty rate fixed at  and three sessions with the penalty rate fixed at . In any given session, a trial consisted of ten decision periods (with the same set of subjects participating in three consecutive trials in any given session)​[4]​. In each trial a different audit level was randomly assigned:,  and . The same set of subjects participated in three consecutive trials in any given session. Each combination of treatment variables of the experiment was replicated  times resulting in a total of eighteen trials. The income level was fixed at  and the tax level was fixed at  for all decision periods and for all sessions. 
In the second experiment, three sessions were conducted with an audit rate fixed at p = 0.1 and three sessions with an audit rate fixed at. As in the first experiment, in any given session a trial consisted of ten decision periods (with the same set of subjects participating in three consecutive trials in any given session). In each trial a different penalty rate was randomly assigned: ,  and . Each cell of the experiment was replicated  times resulting in a total of eighteen trials in the six sessions. The income level was fixed at  and the tax level was fixed at  for all decision periods and for all sessions. 
The values of the penalty rates and audit rates were kept fixed for the two experiments. Although, in some cases, this led to different joint values across trials, there is a qualitative correspondence in terms of theoretical response (the parameters were set so that the optimal response in some trials was for evasion to occur () and in other trials for full compliance ()). This was necessary because previous studies have indicated that there is likely to be insensitivity in individuals’ responses in terms of the evasion criterion and in terms of predicted theoretical levels of compliance (see for example Alm et al, 1992). 

2.2.2. Participants and instructions
The experiments were conducted using undergraduate geography students at Cairo University during April 2007. Forty eight students participated in experiment 1 (42% males and 58% females) and forty eight students participated in experiment 2 (31% males and 69% females). In total, ninety-six students participated in both experiments. For each experiment there were six groups with eight students participating in each session. 
The instructions given to the participants followed those of other experimental studies. The decision facing participants was the amount of income to declare (represented by  in the expected utility model). Income given to participants, , was represented by tokens and participants were notified that they were all given  tokens. The income declaration decision was repeated a number of times (but participants were not informed of the number of decision periods). Participants were informed of all the parameter values in each trial (income, tax rate, audit rate and penalty rate). In addition, during the description of the experiment they were given examples and they were asked to calculate all relevant values. This phase of the experiment could last for up to half an hour to ensure that all participants correctly understood the decision problem. Net income was determined by the occurrence of an audit; participants were informed that audits were random (a uniform probability distribution was used). Explicit instructions were given to maximize net income. Participants were informed that there was the incentive of a monetary reward; tokens earned during the session would be converted to cash. There was no communication between participants.

2.3. Assessing the results: identifying ‘interaction effects’?

In this section of the paper the objective is to test for the existence of an interaction effect, i.e. (i) whether a change in income declaration attributed to a change in the audit rate is also sensitive to the penalty for evasion and (ii) whether a change in income declaration attributed to a change in the penalty is also sensitive to the audit rate. While studies have already noted the relevance of interaction effects (see Kirchler et al, 2010), here the objective is to identify these effects and to explain the pattern of these effects.

2.3.1. The first experiment: a constant penalty rate and varying audit rate 
While the theoretical analysis (section 2.1) is concerned with the amount of declared income, experimental results in this study (and most other experimental studies) are based on the mean compliance rate (percentage of declared income to actual income: )​[5]​.  The mean compliance rates for the specified values of the penalty rate, , and the audit rate, , are presented in table 1​[6]​. There is a direct positive effect of increasing penalties on compliance at each level of the audit rate. At  audits have no effect on mean compliance rates; at  increasing the audit rate results in a significant increase in the mean compliance rate from  to ​[7]​. There are significant differences in changes in the mean audit rate (F(2, 1434) = 13.27, p < 0.001)​[8]​ and the mean penalty rate (F(1, 1434) = 138.68, p < 0.001 ). The interaction between the audit rate and penalty rate is also significant (F(2, 1434) = 12.21, p < 0.001). 

Table 1. Mean compliance rates for different audit rates (experiment 1)





Note: tax rate,  and income,  tokens for all sessions and periods.


The pattern of interaction between the audit rate and penalty rate is depicted in figure 1a. Interaction between the audit and penalty rates is observed in the different patterns of compliance at and  (Christensen, 1997). While increasing the audit rate at  has no effect on compliance, there is a marked effect when the penalty rate . Predictions of compliance response to audit rate changes depend on the penalty rate. In contrast when variables act independently, predictions concerning compliance when the audit rate changes are straightforward; the magnitude of the change in compliance levels for equivalent changes in the audit rate is unaltered by the value of the penalty rate.

[Insert FIGURE 1a]   

The values adopted for the audit and penalty rates are justified on the basis of experimental methodology. However, penalty and audit rates of the order comparable to the lower levels  and are faced by the taxpayer. It is possible to interpret, as suggested by Alm et al (1992), higher penalty rates as reflecting a severe cost, apart from payment, associated with the process of being penalized for evasion. While the experimental design is based on random audits, a higher audit rate could be interpreted as reflecting the situation facing individuals when an endogenous audit rule is applied, i.e. evasion in one period might lead to audits conducted for previous or future periods (Alm et al, 1993). In this way, using high audit rate values in an experimental setting can thus be justified.


2.3.2. The second experiment: a constant audit rate and varying penalty rate 
The mean compliance rates for the specified values of the audit rate,, and the penalty rate are presented in table 2 There are significant differences in changes in the mean penalty rate (F(2, 1434) = 2.72, p < 0.1) and the mean audit rate (F(1, 1434) = 102.27, p < 0.001). The interaction between the audit rate and penalty rate is also significant (F(2, 1434) = 3.02, p < 0.05). 


Table 2. Mean compliance rates for different penalty rates (experiment 2)





Note: tax rate, and income, tokens for all sessions and periods. 





A comparison of compliance rates between the two experiments offers insight into the consistency of subjects’ responses. A variation in compliance response is observed between groups of subjects facing levels of deterrence (,), with small or insignificant discrepancy between groups of subjects facing deterrent levels (,), (,) and (,). From this perspective, findings may be interpreted as indicating a reasonable consistency between the results of the two experiments.  However, there is variation when considering the change in the compliance response to changes in the deterrent variables. For example, in experiment 1 at  there is an increase in compliance when the penalty rate is increased from to; in experiment 2 the compliance rate remains unchanged. This variation could be due to a number of reasons. First, in experiment 1 there is a between-subjects analysis for the penalty rate and within-subjects for the audit rate, while in experiment 2 there is a between-subjects analysis for the audit rate and within-subjects for the penalty rate​[12]​. Second, the compliance response is between different groups of subjects. Third, despite every care being taken, experiments are social interactions so that unconscious variations in cueing, eye contact, manner of speaking, etc. can affect responses.
The experiments conducted in this study are based on repeated decision-making. This is justified when economic agents are assumed to have bounded rationality. Thus, even when subjects are fully informed of the decision problem and relevant parameters, repetition of the decision is often required to allow subjects to gain experience with the specified parameters and to understand the implications of the decision made. Typically, initial decisions are driven primarily by social norms followed by a period where subjects begin to learn (Gale et al, 1995). Can a learning process be used to explain the experimental observations in this study? Can a dynamic learning process result in deviations from optimal income declarations? These issues are addressed in the following section of the paper. They are addressed by considering the way individuals make income declaration decisions in a dynamic context and by considering the way that interaction influences decisions.  


3. Adaptive learning and tax evasion 

The assumption of neoclassical theory is that learning is encapsulated by economic agents exogenous to the model. This situation is interpreted by Lucas (1986: S402) in the context of rationality in economics, as “… studying decision rules that are steady states of some adaptive process, decision rules that are found to work over a range of situations and hence are no longer revised appreciably as more experience accumulates”. Adaptive processes based on optimization principles incorporate feedback mechanisms that result in increasing the likelihood of adopting the most successful decisions (Cross, 1983). These include reinforcement learning, replicator dynamic models and evolutionary models; models that are differentiated by feedback mechanisms. The feedback mechanism can be thought of as representing the manner of relaying and processing information regarding successful decisions. So while the selection of a particular model may appear to be arbitrary, these models are based on the same principles; choices are directed towards payoff improvement​[13]​.  
After describing the adaptive learning process used in this study, simulations of the income declaration decision are compared with the decisions that subjects made in the two experiments. A comparison is also made between the predictions of the static neoclassical model and the dynamic model. A description of the underlying dynamics of the learning process is presented to understand why behaviour based on adaptation may lead to sub-optimal income declaration levels.

3.1. Description of the adaptive learning process 

The adaptive learning process is based on repetition of the income declaration decision (described in section 2.1.1). Instead of assuming an individual acts to maximize expected utility, the basis of the model is the set of the alternative decisions termed the ‘population’. Here the population consists of levels of declared income, . The process is concerned with the dynamic evolution of (the proportion of individuals in the population declaring a given income,), which is determined by:

The change in the current representation of  (the proportion of individuals declaring income  in the population, ) , depends on payoffs determined by the utility gained from net income . The growth of better performing decisions is the result of increasing the level of representation of decisions that have above average payoffs  (average payoff is denoted by) and reducing representation of those that have below average payoffs. A decision (income declared) is removed when its payoff becomes negative​[14]​. In the implementation an income level is set at. Declared income levels  are set at integer values in the interval [0,]​[15]​. Net income is determined by the occurrence of an audit​[16]​.
Two utility functions are used. The function is used as representative of risk-averse utility;  represents net income and the parameter is the, so-called, index of absolute risk aversion. The parameters employed here are and income. While the chosen risk aversion coefficient is high, these parameter values are adopted to facilitate a comparison with empirical results presented in the paper​[17]​. A risk-neutral utility function,, was also used. 
The dynamics of the adaptive learning process can be interpreted on two levels; the individual level and the group level. A decision-maker is usually not committed to one opinion or one way of behaving. Rather there are several opinions or ideas (a population of ideas) in their mind in any one instance. The opinion or idea that predominates will depend on the experience of the individual. An individual may form different opinions and try different decisions over time (about the amount of income to declare) and ultimately make a decision based on experience (Axelrod, 1990). Alternatively, in a group there is a population of decision-makers who observe and imitate each other. A decision may be adopted by observing its profitability when used by other individuals. In this study interpretation of learning dynamics at the individual level is adopted to account for the decision-making described by the neoclassical model and followed by the experimental subjects. Since only the alternative choices at the outset of the process are available, Axelrod used the term ecological simulation to describe the dynamic process​[18]​.

3.2. Comparison of experimental and simulation results

In this section experimental data and simulation results are compared to examine the extent to which adaptive learning might account for observed compliance response. Simulations were conducted using risk-averse and risk-neutral utility presented in section 4.1. Two sets of initial conditions were used in the simulations. The first set comprises initial income declarations estimated from the experimental data and in the second set the assumption is that initial income declarations are chosen randomly. In the simulations no restrictions were placed on parameter values. When negative payoffs occurred the associated income levels were subsequently not used. 
Figures 2a and 2b depict data from experiment 1 and experiment 2 respectively and data generated from simulations using the same parameter values as the experiment. The data generated in the simulations is averaged over the ten periods for comparison with experimental data. There is qualitative and quantitative correspondence between data from experiment 1 and data generated from simulations with payoffs based on risk-averse utility. This is also the case (but to a lesser extent) when payoffs are based on risk-neutral utility. The compliance response pattern for the simulated data is not similar to data for experiment 2. However, initial income declarations appear to be a relevant factor in describing the different compliance response for data in experiment 2 at an audit rate of. While the observed decline in compliance is surprising, simulation results suggest that the initial response of subjects might be important. 

[Insert FIGURE 2a] [Insert FIGURE 2b]


3.3. Predictions of the expected utility model and learning algorithm

A recurrent observation concerning tax evasion experiments is that declared income levels are consistently higher than would be predicted by the expected utility model. The aim of this section is an analysis of the steady state behavior of the dynamic learning process and an examination of the mechanisms of the dynamic process in order to determine conditions under which behavioural paths deviate from optimality. An understanding of the mechanisms of the dynamic model might also be descriptive of the manner that subjects respond to deterrence in experiments.
 As illustrated by the time histories depicted in figure A2 in the appendix, there is convergence to optimal and sub-optimal income declarations for parameter values ()​[19]​; convergence to the optimal level of declared income,, occurs for deterrent levels (); for deterrent levels () the dynamic process converges to ​[20]​. In the simulation results, reported in this section, payoffs are based on risk-neutral utility. The dynamic process may also generate sub-optimal compliance levels for risk-averse utility.
The evolution in the proportions of the population,, declaring different income levels, , captures the underlying dynamic process summarized by the time histories of figure A2 in the appendix. The adjustment rate for each decision depends on the incidence of an audit. When an audit occurs, there is growth in representation of the highest income declarations due to above average payoffs  since there is either an absence of a penalty or a low penalty level incurred. An audit results in a decline in representation of lower income declarations due to below average payoffs. In the case of non-occurrence of an audit the situation is reversed. The outcome of the dynamic process depends jointly on the audit and penalty rates as illustrated below.
The frequency distributions in figure 3a depicts the proportions in the population adopting each income declaration for deterrent levels (), with initial equal representation of income declarations. The optimal income declaration level () emerges in the initial stages of the simulation with monotonic growth in its representation throughout the dynamic process. The frequency distribution for deterrent levels () with equal initial representation is depicted in figure 3b. After an initial stage characterized by oscillation in representation levels​[21]​, there is growth in the representation of two levels of income declaration and . In the final stages there is oscillation between and until convergence towards the declared income level of.  
The eventual outcome of the dynamic process for () and for () depends on the magnitude of the adjustment rate,, in the dynamic process when there is an audit. The decline in representation of, when the penalty is , that occurs when there is an audit is offset by the more frequently occurring increases in representation during the non-occurrence of an audit. When the penalty is , an audit results in a greater rate of decline in representation of and that is not offset by subsequent growth in representation during the non-occurrence of an audit resulting in their elimination. 

[Insert FIGURE 3a] [Insert FIGURE 3b] 








This paper has focused on the importance of ‘learning’ when analysing the way that individuals comply with taxation. Patterns of individuals’ responses to changes in audit and penalty rates in experiments (designed to detect interaction between audit and penalty rates) proved broadly consistent with patterns of simulations produced when individuals rely on a dynamic adaptive learning process. 
When analysing the difference between observed compliance and compliance predicted by static neoclassical theory, it is important to note that taxpayers are in a learning process.  Levels of tax compliance may never be the same as levels predicted by static neoclassical theory. New generations of citizens are always joining the cohort of citizens asked to declare income and citizens are at different stages in their learning process. The first conclusion is that taxpayers’ learning processes are important when explaining differences between observed and predicted levels of tax compliance.
The second conclusion is that there is evidence of a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates. This is important when predicting the pattern of compliance that taxpayers are likely to report. When analysing this pattern, it is unlikely that an individual taxpayer’s declaration will converge to the static neoclassical predicted level of declaration at every combination of audit and penalty rates. While a dynamic interaction of audit and penalty rates might result in fully ‘rational’ behaviour at low levels of these policy deterrent variables, at higher levels the evidence is that dynamic compliance will deviate from predictions drawn from the static neoclassical model. As in so many other behavioural studies (e.g. Mittone 2006), experimental responses appear to reflect both instrumental and bounded rationality. 
Before turning to policy implications, how general are the results reported in this paper? There are two concerns:

(i) The first concern is that the paper relies on students’ responses. Is it possible to generalise?  Many studies in the economics of psychology rely on students’ responses and research has indicated that these cognitive responses are representative of cognitive responses more generally. Alm and Jacobson (2007:143) insist that: “…there is now much evidence that the experimental responses of students are seldom different than the responses of other subjects (Plott, 1987). There is no reason to believe that the cognitive processes of students are different from those of ‘real’ people”.  It is also important to note that the conclusions (reported above) resonate with conclusions reported in other behavioural studies. List (2003) has shown that ‘professionals’ are more likely to rely on instrumental assessment, than on behavioural heuristics, when making decisions. The implication is that the acquisition of learning increases individuals’ tendency to make instrumental decisions. 

(ii) The second concern is that the conclusions (reported above) are based on an analysis that has not considered other motivations, e.g. intrinsic motivation and willingness to comply with social norms. When Feld and Frey (2002) considered tax compliance, they argued that tax authorities’ treatment of taxpayers is very important. Individuals are more likely to comply honestly if they are treated respectfully (they are less likely to derive intrinsic motivation from compliance if tax authorities fail to acknowledge their sense of civic duty). Kirchler et al (2007) refer to the ‘slippery slope’ that tax authorities might experience if they fail to acknowledge the intrinsic value that individuals derive from tax compliance. But of course, our paper does not dismiss the relevance of other considerations.  It is clear that the decisions reported in this paper do not perfectly mirror (and do not always converge to) purely self-interested, instrumental decisions. Other considerations are likely to be important and, in this context, it is important to note that agent-based models and systems dynamics models can be employed to assess the relevance of other possible determinants of tax compliance (Mittone and Patelli, 2000; Blomquist, 2006; Pommerenhe et al, 1994). Pommerenhe et al (1994) examined the erosion of tax morale. Mittone and Patelli (2000) examined the effect of the initial composition of different types of taxpayers in the population on the eventual composition of each taxpayer group. The conclusion reported above is that learning is an important consideration; not that learning is the only important consideration when analysing tax compliance.

With these qualifications, conclusions in this paper are relevant when designing policy to deter tax evasion. In the first instance, evidence that learning is important is relevant when assessing the impact that policy is likely to achieve. In the second instance, the observation that there is a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates is important when deciding how to combine deterrent variables. Some studies argue that policymakers should rely more heavily on penalties, because penalties are transfers and audits are expensive in terms of resources (e.g. Pyle 1991). Critics question whether heavy reliance on penalties will destroy the marginal deterrence structure inherent in a more apposite penalty structure (Myles, 1995). The conclusions in this paper inform policymakers that they should also consider the impact of their preferred combination of audit and penalty rates on the way that citizens learn to comply. 
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FIGURE 1a
Illustration of the direct and interaction effects of the audit rate, p, and penalty rate,  on compliance: the dashed line represents the level of compliance in the absence of a positive audit-penalty rate (p -) interaction effect (experiment 1)

FIGURE 1b
Illustration of the direct and interaction effects of the audit rate, p, and penalty rate,  on compliance: the dashed line represents the level of compliance in the absence of interaction effects (experiment 2)

FIGURE 2a
Comparison of experiment 1 and simulations: mean compliance rates for experimental data (solid line with marker); simulation data with equal initial income declarations (solid line) and initial income declaration from experiment (dashed line) after ten iterations for risk-averse utility function and for the risk-neutral utility function: = 1; is net income; income; tax rate . 

FIGURE 2b
Comparison of experiment 2 and simulations: mean compliance rates for experimental data (solid line with marker); simulation data with equal initial income declarations (solid line) and initial income declaration from experiment (dashed line) after ten iterations for risk-averse utility function and for the risk-neutral utility function: = 1; is net income; income; tax rate . 

FIGURE 3a
Frequency distribution for decisions on amount of declared income for selected number of iterations (risk-neutral utility function): audit rate; penalty rate; income I = 10; tax rate .

FIGURE 3b
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^1	  Other adaptive learning models have also been used for comparison with, and interpretation of, experimental data. These include the use of a genetic algorithm to determine optimal output in a cobweb model (Afrovic, 1994) and comparison of reinforcement learning models to data sets associated with different experimental games (Roth and Erev, 1995).
^2	  The rate of change of optimal declared income  with the audit and penalty rates are   andand 
^3	  The use of a full factorial design where each subject participates in all treatment conditions would have resulted in an experiment of excessive duration and the possibility of errors due to fatigue.  
^4	  As tax declaration is an ongoing process in the ‘real world’, it is important to study a series of decision periods in the experimental study.
^5	  In this study the distribution of income declarations shows that a mean compliance rate of say 42% would not imply that all subjects declare 42% of their income.
^6	  Compliance rates over the ten decision periods do not display any consistent or discernable pattern (see figure A1 in the appendix).
^7	  At , the difference in means is not statistically significant: the t-statistic for  and  is ; and;and  is  (data sets consist of the aggregated individual compliance rates in each period). At the increase in compliance from  to is statistically significant (the t-statistic is ) and from  and  is statistically insignificant (the t-statistic is).  
^8	  p for the F- test is not italic, to distinguish this from p the audit rate.
^9	  The averaged rate of change of compliance (over the two audit rate levels) would give misleading results. 
^10	  At the difference in means between  and ; andis not statistically  significant. At  changes in the compliance rate when the penalty increases from  to  and from  to  are statistically significant: the t-statistic between means at  and  is; and;  and  is . 
^11	  Further investigation is required to provide an explanation for this observation that could also apply to results obtained in experiment 1. There is also the possibility that the decline in compliance response is due to a sequencing effect in which case further experimental investigation is required.
^12	  A questionnaire administered to economics students at Bath University showed consistency of response which might be due to the elimination of sampling errors. Details of the questionnaire study are available from the authors upon request. 
^13	  Qualitatively similar results hold for these learning models (Gale et al, 1995).
^14	  Gale et al (1995) in study of the ultimatum game do not allow any strategy to be eliminated by continuously introducing small proportions of all strategies to ensure that optimal strategies have the opportunity to eliminate other strategies in the long-run. This is not implemented in our study.
^15	  Though any value of declared income may be adopted () restriction of the set of values is required. Simulations using non-integer values generated the same results as those using integer values.
^16	  Net income:(no audit conducted) and (audit conducted), is the marginal tax rate and is the penalty rate.
^17	  This utility function, characterised by constant absolute risk aversion, has proved empirically popular but like any chosen functional form it has specific properties. A value  implies risk aversion with higher positive values indicating greater risk aversion altering the curvature of the posited utility of income function so that it displays greater concavity. As noted this functional form exhibits constant absolute risk aversion so that equally risky prospects generate the same risk premium independent of the income level. While this may be worrying in some applications (decreasing absolute risk aversion is a common assumption in many studies ), here experimental income is fixed for all participants and it is appropriate to focus on the riskiness of the prospect alone.
^18	  Evolutionary algorithms such the genetic algorithm, are best suited to solve difficult optimization problems and where the domain containing the solution is not known so that new potential solutions need to be generated. This is not the case for the income declaration problem.   
^19	  Total evasion is predicted by theory (for risk-neutral utility). 
^20	  Several repetitions of the same parameter values with different number seeding were conducted. The simulations results are for parameter values with positive payoffs (no constraint was imposed).
^21	  The initial stages of the dynamic process might display a different representation depending on the number of audits generated by the random number sequence.
